Éditeur : CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
ISBN papier: 9781107547506
Parution : 2015
Code produit : 1309958
Catégorisation :
Livres /
Sciences humaines /
Sciences politiques /
Relations internationales
Format | Qté. disp. | Prix* | Commander |
---|---|---|---|
Livre papier | En rupture de stock** |
Prix membre : 37,67 $ Prix non-membre : 39,65 $ |
*Les prix sont en dollars canadien. Taxes et frais de livraison en sus.
**Ce produits est en rupture de stock mais sera expédié dès qu'ils sera disponible.
Coercive diplomacy the use of threats and assurances to alter another state's behavior is an indispensable to international relations. Most scholarship has focused on whether and when states are able to use coercive methods to achieve their desired results. However, employing game-theoretic tools, statistical modeling, and detailed case study analysis, Power Plays builds and tests a theory that explains how states develop strategies of coercive diplomacy, how their targets shield themselves from these efforts, and the implications for interstate relations. Focusing on the World Trade Organization, Power Plays argues that coercive diplomacy often precludes cooperation due to fears of exploitation, but that international institutions can solve these problems by convincing states to eschew certain tools for coercive purposes." Published: May 2015 Coercive diplomacy - the use of threats and assurances to alter another state's behavior - is an indispensable to international relations. Most scholarship has focused on whether and when states are able to use coercive methods to achieve their desired results. However, employing game-theoretic tools, statistical modeling, and detailed case study analysis, Power Plays builds and tests a theory that explains how states develop strategies of coercive diplomacy, how their targets shield themselves from these efforts, and the implications for interstate relations. Focusing on the World Trade Organization, Power Plays argues that coercive diplomacy often precludes cooperation due to fears of exploitation, but that international institutions can solve these problems by convincing states to eschew certain tools for coercive purposes. Published: May 2015