Éditeur : MIT PRESS
ISBN papier: 9780262528535
Parution : 2016
Code produit : 1322574
Catégorisation :
Livres /
Gestion /
Économie /
Ouvrages généraux
Format | Qté. disp. | Prix* | Commander |
---|---|---|---|
Livre papier | 1 |
Prix membre : 19,08 $ Prix non-membre : 21,20 $ |
*Les prix sont en dollars canadien. Taxes et frais de livraison en sus.
The authors explain what constitutes an auction and how auctions can be modeled as games of asymmetric information—that is, games in which some players know something that other players do not. They characterize behavior in these strategic situations and maintain a focus on the real world by illustrating their discussions with examples that include not just auctions held by eBay and Sotheby’s, but those used by Google, the U.S. Treasury, TaskRabbit, and charities. Readers will begin to understand how economists model auctions and how the rules of the auction shape bidder incentives. They will appreciate the role auctions play in our modern economy and understand why these selling mechanisms are so resilient.